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ARMEL CATES*

Swap Financing
I. Introduction

The purpose of this article is briefly to highlight certain aspects of swap
transactions which are of particular current interest to bankers and their
lawyers. Accordingly, we will have to forego the luxury, or perhaps agony,
of exploring and dissecting in detail the various commercial and legal
issues involved.
It is, however, worth recapping on the history of swaps and their essential elements. Before 1978, back-to-back and parallel loans were often
entered into. Under those structures, a U.K. company would lend sterling
to a U.S. company, to fund a U.K. investment by the U.S. company, and
the U.S. company would lend dollars to the U.K. company, to fund a
U.S. investment by the U.K. company. This allowed exchange rate fluctuations to be hedged and also had significant U.K. exchange control
advantages.' Sometimes a bank would be interposed as an intermediary
or, more often, the loans would be to subsidiaries, i.e., the U.K. company
lent to a U.K. subsidiary of the U.S. company and vice versa. These
structures raised complex questions regarding set-off and the giving of
security 2 and also taxable exposure to notional currency gains. 3 They also
constituted borrowings for borrowing restriction purposes.
*Clifford-Turner, London.
I. The restrictions imposed by the Exchange Control Act, 1947, were lifted in October
1979. See Exchange Control Regulation EC84, Removal of Exchange Controls.
2. Contractual rights of set-off may be registerable as a charge on book debts under
Section 395 of the Companies Act, 1985. As to the enforceability of contractual rights of
set-off which seek to extend the statutory provisions contained in the Bankruptcy Act, 1914,
see British Eagle International Airlines v. Compagnie Nationale Air France [1975] I W.L.R.
758 HL.
3. On the repayment of the loan by the U.K. company, if during the term of the loan,
the value of the currency to be received had fallen against the currency to be paid, the
realization of the amount to be repaid might, in certain circumstances, give rise to a currency
gain liable to capital gains tax.
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In 1977, U.S. investment banks began comparing back-to-back loans
with swaps. As we know today, the concept was in fact extremely simple.
Rather than A Corp lending one currency to B Corp and B Corp lending
another currency to A Corp, A Corp enters into a spot exchange transaction with B Corp for the sale of one currency for another and a forward
exchange transaction under which the original sale and purchase will be
reversed. The currency swap had been born. As no loans had been made
(or so it was hoped), interest would not be paid, but fees were exchanged
which corresponded to an interest calculation. As there were no loans,
the transaction was off of the balance sheet. These original concepts of
the swap remain valid today and it is important always to bear in mind
that (a) all swaps are effectively the equivalent of borrowings but (b) they
do not constitute loans.
Today the underlying motivation for most swaps has changed and is
arbitrage. It is from arbitrage that the interest swap has evolved. A Corp
can borrow fixed rate funds more cheaply than B Corp but requires floating
rate funds; B Corp can raise the floating rate funds at a lower margin than
the margin it pays when raising fixed rate funds. A Corp therefore borrows
the fixed rate funds and B Corp pays to A Corp, not interest, but an
amount equal to the fixed rate interest payable by A Corp and A Corp
pays to B Corp, not interest, but an amount equal to the interest payable
by B Corp on the floating rate funds raised by B Corp. In fact, where a
bank is the counter-party, A Corp will pay B Corp, the bank, for the
credit risk it is taking and, accordingly, B Corp will pay slightly less than
the rate at which it could have raised the floating rate funds in the market.
If B Corp can raise floating rate funds at, say, LIBOR what B Corp pays
to A Corp is, for example, LIBOR minus 1/4. The currency swap has
become an extension of this arbitrage where not only interest but also
currency is swapped. Indeed, the interest element and the currency elements of the arbitrage may now be swapped with different counter-parties.
The most significant development in swaps since the late 1970s has been
how transactions are structured. Initially the role of banks tended to be
finding two parties and charging a flat fee for putting them together. Then,
two interconnected factors changed the role of the banks. Firstly, their
business is that of assessing credit and if they were prepared to take the
credit risk of the respective counter-parties by acting as a principal in the
middle of the transaction, rather than simply acting as a broker, they could
implement many more transactions. Furthermore, the banks could make
a turn on the transaction and substantially increase their fee income accordingly without using up their balance sheet capacity. This has led to
a rapid expansion of the swap market. As the participants and competition
have increased, swaps have been put together much more rapidly and
control has passed from transaction originators to dealers. Weeks are no
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longer spent agreeing to documentation before the parties consider themselves committed, but rather the dealers agree to the terms of the swap
over the telephone and the documentation is expected to follow as a
formality. Banks have also created swap pools taking a position so that
they will enter into a swap with one counter-party without having a matching contract on the other end, in the anticipation that the matching contract
will be found at a later date.
II. Legal Considerations
I will now review briefly some of the legal considerations which have
evolved from these rapid changes in the swap market.
A.

STANDARDIZATION OF DOCUMENTATION

As the volume and speed of transactions has increased, a growing
consciousness has arisen of the exposure between the time when the terms
of a swap have been agreed and the time when the documentation is
signed. This has led to a number of developments. These include: (i)
banks which find themselves entering into swaps on a regular basis with
other banks agreeing a standard form of documentation which will be
adopted by them; (2) the introduction of Master Agreements between
parties with the intention either of creating a standard set of terms which
will be incorporated into individual transactions or of attempting to make
individual swaps part of one overall transaction; (3) in June 1985, the
International Swap Dealers Association in New York published a code of
standard wording, assumptions and provisions for interest rate swaps (the
ISDA Code), the provisions of which can be incorporated by crossreference into agreements; and (4) in August 1985, the British Bankers'
Association (BBA) published complete short-form agreements for both
4
interest and currency swaps (the BBAIRS terms).

B.

TERMINATION EVENTS

One of, if not the principal, issue which dominates any negotiation of
swap documentation is the events which will permit the contract to be
terminated and the consequences which will flow from the termination.
These fall into three basic categories.

4. The BBAIRS terms are to be regarded as normal market practice for interbank transactions with maturities up to and including two years and which fall within the categories
covered. Banks and brokers in the London interbank market are expected to quote on the
basis of the BBAIRS terms and should make it clear to potential counter-parties if they
wish to deal on other terms.
SUMMER 1986
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Firstly, there is usually a clause providing for payments to be made
free of deduction for taxes and imposing an obligation to "gross up" if
any withholding arises. On what basis, if any, will a party who has become
obliged to gross up be entitled to terminate? It is worth mentioning in this
context that the nature of swap payments for fiscal purposes is by no
means clearly established in all jurisdictions. In the United Kingdom, the
Inland Revenue has made non-binding pronouncements. 5 1 believe the
U.S. position also gives rise to difficult considerations. Outside a domestic
transaction, it is also necessary to consider the implications under double
tax treaties, which do not directly address the issue of payments under
swap agreements, bearing in mind that such payments are not interest.
Often the dealers creating swaps have no awareness of the tax
considerations.
Secondly what happens if the swap becomes illegal for one of the parties
to perform?
Finally, there will be the usual events of default which will entitle a
party to terminate. The tendency has been for these events of default to
be narrow. Their scope will, however, depend on the credit standing of
the parties, whether it is a currency or an interest swap (the exposure
being greater in the former case), and the term of the agreement. The
mutual nature of the contract, of course, influences these considerations
because the same events of default normally apply to both parties.
C.

TERMINATION COMPENSATION

Resolving the circumstances in which a party will be entitled to terminate, however, only deals with half the problem. The other is how the
amount of any compensation payable as a result of the termination is to
be calculated, bearing in mind that one is not dealing with the repayment
of loans, but with compensation or damages for breach of contract.
5. The U.K. Revenue takes the view that swap payments exchanged by reference to
interest rates constitute "annual payments" under Section 53 of the Income and Corporation
Taxes Act, 1970. Accordingly, a U.K. party making such payments is, subject to the exceptions mentioned below, required to deduct tax at the basic income tax rate and to account
for the same to the U.K. Revenue. The U.K. party making such payments will be entitled
to a tax deduction for such payments on the basis that they are "charges on income," and
allowable as a deduction against total profits under Section 248 of the aforesaid Act. By
way of concession, the U.K. Revenue has confirmed that if a bank carrying on a bona fide
banking business in the United Kingdom (and which is formally recognized as such by the
U.K. Revenue) enters into a swap as principal, and not merely as arranger, swap fees paid
to or by such bank may be made gross without deduction of income tax. This concession
applies both to banks incorporated in the United Kingdom and to the U.K. branches of
foreign incorporated banks but does not apply where a U.K. party makes a payment to a
non-U.K. branch of a U.K. or foreign bank. It may also be possible to make payment
without deduction in accordance with any applicable double tax treaty.
VOL. 20, NO. 3
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The original discussion was whether there should simply be an obligation to pay general damages for the loss arising from the termination
or whether there should be a formula to provide how damages should be
calculated. The proponents of the former argued in favor of simplicity
and the fact that any formula was exposed to being held unenforceable
as a penalty. The advocates of the latter, who seem to have won the
discussion, argued for certainty and the fact that the parties should establish how they wish the compensation to be determined rather than
leaving it to a judge who is likely to be wholly ignorant of the nature of
the transaction and its underlying economics.
Discussions now primarily revolve around whether the compensation
should be quantified by (1) assessing the amount that would be required
to create a flow of funds from an investment which would produce the
payments which would have flowed from the swap and discounting that
amount to a present value or (2) having a third party quote the cost of
creating an equivalent swap to replace the one which has been terminated.
This latter approach, however, presupposes the existence of a sufficiently
strong secondary market. This may be questionable in the environment
existing today, but the market has evolved so fast that it may be becoming
more realistic each month. Termination formulae also raise interesting
considerations as to how the benefits of the defaulting party under the
contract should be evaluated and whether, if they have a positive value,
the termination provisions should allow for a payment to flow from the
innocent party to the other party. How calculations should be made can
form the subject of lengthy negotiation and substantial benefits could flow
if the different types of calculations generally acceptable to the market
could be standardized and6 adopted like the Uniform Customs and Practices for letters of credit.
D.

INSOLVENCY

Legal opinions generally contain a bankruptcy exception. However, the
consequences of insolvency on a swap will normally fall to be treated

differently than a loan. Swap agreements are usually expressed to be
governed by English law or New York law. However, if one party becomes

the subject of insolvency proceedings, the effect of the insolvency will
not be governed by the law of the agreement, but rather the law of the

6. The ISDA Code, see supra text accompanying note 4, contains a number of methods
for determining the amount of compensation payable upon termination, namely on an indemnity basis, by reference to a formula or by reference to the cost of replacing the terminated agreement. Payments may be made either on a "one-way" basis or on a "twoway" basis depending on the option selected by the parties. The BBAIRS, see id., terms
provide for a one-way indemnity based compensation payment.
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jurisdiction where the insolvency proceedings are being conducted (which
will usually be the law of the place where the insolvent party is incorporated or has its principal place of business). Can the termination provisions be enforced against the trustee in bankruptcy or liquidator or a
sum which has been contractually calculated be proved in the insolvency?
Alternatively, will the trustee or liquidator be entitled to avoid the termination provisions and insist on the performance of the swap if it is for
his benefit? Dealers are not usually lawyers
and have tended to ignore
7
these questions when creating swaps.
E.

CREDIT EXPOSURE

The increasing volume of swaps which have been written by banks has
made several of them reconsider their credit exposure to specific counterparties with whom they have entered into a substantial number of transactions. Must they look at their exposure on a gross basis, or can a bank
simply look at its net exposure to another bank or bank group? What is
the position if the swaps have been entered into by several different
branches of a bank or even its affiliates? How would exposures fall to be
converted if different currencies are involved? All these matters have to
be looked at on a jurisdiction-by-jurisdiction basis. The novelty of the
market is such that few questions can be answered with unreserved certainty. Attempts are, however, now being made to address these issues
in the documentation. I have mentioned earlier the Master Agreement
concept. 8 One of the approaches used is to provide that swaps made
between the same parties are all part of one transaction, so that a trustee
in bankruptcy or liquidator of an insolvent counter-party could not seek
to enforce those swaps under which the insolvent counter-party has gained
a benefit through market fluctuations in interest or exchange rates, but
repudiate those swaps which have moved to his disadvantage and leave
the other party to prove in the insolvency for the loss arising from them. 9
F.

TRADING IN SWAPS

As interest rates or exchange rates move, so the benefit which a party
to a swap derives from it will increase or decrease, and that party may
wish to realize its gain or terminate its exposure. Furthermore, a party
who has entered into a swap may wish to unwind the swap for commercial

7. These issues are addressed in a chapter of a book which is to be published by Euromoney on Swap Financing written by Schnyler Henderson and Armel Cates.
8. See supra text accompanying note 4.
9. See Companies Act, 1985, § 618.
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or treasury reasons. A number of ways of achieving these objectives have
recently been introduced.
The first involves the parties to the original swap agreeing to unwind
the swap prematurely, with one party paying to the other a premium. The
problem with this method is that it requires the consent of both parties,
and the gain is immediately crystallized for tax purposes rather than being
spread over the remainder of the term of the original swap. Some swap
agreements now build in provisions for voluntary early termination, subject to an early termination payment calculated in accordance with a preagreed formula.
Another method which is used is transferring or assigning the benefit
of the agreement to a third party. The difficulty with this method is, firstly,
that most swap agreements have contained contractual restrictions on
assignments and, therefore, the consent of the other party is still required.
Secondly, a swap is inevitably an agreement which requires not only an
assignment of rights but also a transfer of obligations. In many jurisdictions, a party cannot unilaterally transfer its contractual obligations, and
a novation is required to which the other original party to the swap must
be joined. Whether the other original party to the swap will agree to this
may depend on a number of considerations but, in particular, the credit
standing of the proposed transferee. It is, of course, possible for the
transferor and the transferee to agree between them that the transferee
will perform the transferor's obligations, but as the transferor will remain
liable to the other original party to the swap, this means the transferor
retains a contingent liability.
The final method also involves the retention of a contingent liability by
the transferor. By this method, the original swap is left in place, but the
party wishing to terminate the swap enters into another swap by which
it effectively reverses the original swap but retains the benefit of the
movement which has occurred in its favor in exchange or interest rates.
Of course, by doing this the transferring party is increasing its exposure,
as it then carries the risk of default by both its original swap counterparty and the new swap counter-party.
G.

REGULATORY CONTROL

Reference was made earlier to the off-balance-sheet nature of swaps.
I have also alluded to how swaps can form part of a chain of interconnected
transactions including several parties and explained how this chain can
be extended by reverse swaps. There seems to be a growing awareness
of the cascade effect which could follow from the collapse of a major
participant in the swap market. There is at present no regulatory control
in the United Kingdom on swapping activities by banks. However, the
SUMMER 1986
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Bank of England in its supervisory role over banks in the United Kingdom
is showing an increasing interest in the off-balance-sheet exposure of
banks. A weighting has recently been given to revolving underwriting
commitments for the purposes of prudential ratios which U.K. banks are
required to maintain. 10 It is anticipated that swaps are likely to follow in
the foreseeable future. I believe the regulatory authorities in other jurisdictions are also considering the position.
H.

RELATED TRANSACTIONS

I mentioned earlier that banks do not now always synchronize swaps
and may enter into a swap with one counter-party without having a reverse
transaction on the other end. In these circumstances the bank itself carries
the risk of future movements in exchange or interest rates. An extension
of this principle has been the creation of forward rate agreements.II
Under these agreements, the parties agree that if a specified type of
interest rate (say three months' dollar LIBOR) in three or six months'
time is above a specified rate of interest, the bank will pay to the counterparty a forward discounted amount of the excess. If, on the other hand,
the future three months' dollar LIBOR rate is less than the specified rate,
the counter-party pays the deficiency to the bank. These arrangements
enable the counter-party to ensure that a floating interest rate which is
payable by it in the future and which falls to be determined in the future,
can be fixed in advance.
The principal legal concern to which these arrangements have given
rise is whether or not they constitute wagering contracts which are frequently unenforceable, as is the case in England. 12 Similar concerns were
originally expressed in relation to interest swaps, but the preponderance
of legal opinion now seems to be that, provided there are valid commercial
reasons underlying the transaction, the laws relating to gaming contracts
will not be applicable.
Similar concerns have been expressed relating to yet another instrument
which has evolved from the swap concept, namely, interest rate guar10. A bank's underwriting obligations under a note issuance facility will be treated as
contingent liabilities for capital adequacy purposes and will be included at a weight of 0.5
in the calculation of the risk-asset ratio, whether or not the facility has been drawn down
by the borrower. See Bank of England Notice BSD/1985/2 (April 1985).
I1. In August 1985, the BBA also published recommended terms and conditions for
Forward Rate Agreements (FRABBA terms).
12. Under the Gaming Act, 1845, a contract which is held to be a wagering contract
would be null and void and confer no rights on either party. However, insofar as a forward
rate agreement has an underlying commercial basis, e.g., in order to protect a bank or
company's position under a specified transaction or series of transactions, the agreement
is unlikely to be construed as a wager.
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antees or options. Under these arrangements, the bank agrees, in consideration of a front-end fee, that to the extent that three or six months'
LIBOR for a particular currency as determined at a future date exceeds
a predetermined rate, the bank will pay the excess to the counter-party
on a forward discounted basis. The difference between this arrangement
and the forward rate agreement is that the counter-party pays a fee rather
than having to pay the bank the difference between the future LIBOR
rate and the fixed rate should the LIBOR rate be less than the agreed
fixed rate. In addition to the gaming contract consideration, these transactions also raise the question of whether or not they constitute insurance
contracts which a bank would not be permitted to enter into unless authorized to carry on insurance business. ' 3 An insurance contract has been
defined under English law as one where one party (the insurer) promises
in return for a money consideration (the premium) to pay to the other
party (the assured) a sum of money or provide him with some corresponding benefit, after the occurrence of one or more specified events. 14
Again, the initial assessment of lawyers in England is that a court would
not hold an interest rate option or guarantee to involve a bank in carrying
on an insurance business.
II. The Future

The swap market has moved a long way since it began in the late 1970s
and will, I am sure, continue to develop during the late 1980s. During this
same period the financial futures markets have also expanded and a greater
interplay between these two markets can perhaps be anticipated.

13. See Insurance Companies Act, 1982.
14.

McGILLIVRAY

& PARKINSON, INSURANCE LAW 3 (7th ed.).
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